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A SYMPOSIUM ON THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE: 1966
(Part 2)
In the September, 1966 issue of the Journal we
published nine of the twelve papers that were
presented at the Conference on the Supreme Court
and the Police: 1966, conducted by Northwestern
University School of Law on April 29 and 30, 1966.
The present issue contains the remaining three
papers.
As pointed out in the preceding issue, the Con-
erence papers were delivered and set in type prior
to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). In some of the following papers, therefore,
editor's notes have been inserted to call attention to
changes rendered necessary by the Miranda de-
cision.
WHO IS ON TRIAL-THE POLICE? THE COURTS?
OR THE CRIMINALLY ACCUSED?
(Comments upon Reflections of a State Reviewing Court Judge Upon the Supreme Court's
Mandates in Criminal Cases by Judge Charles S. Desmond.)
ROBERT C. FINLEY*
In a span of about thirty years, most notably in
the last seven or eight, a sizable group of dramatic
and significant decisions involving criminal law
administration has emanated from the Chambers
of the "Nine Old Men" in Washington, D. C.
These cases appear to be unprecedented in their
impact upon the methodology and the mechanics
of law enforcement. They dearly interdict heavy-
handed police tactics involving physical harm and
injury to criminal suspects caught up in the toils
of the law. Few, if any, would take issue with this
aspect of the cases. But .Escobedo v. Illinois,'
Massiah v. United States,2 Wong Sun v. United
States,3 Traub v. Connecticut,4 Mapp v. Oltio,5 et al.,
go considerably beyond judicial interdiction of
physical abuse of criminal suspects by law enforce-
ment officers. 6 In effect, they prohibit continuation
* Justice, Supreme Court of the State of Washing-
ton.
The paper that is the subject of Justice Finley's
comments appeared in the September, 1966 issue of
this Journal, at p. 301.
'378 U.S. 478 (1964)
2 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
3 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
4 187 A.2d 230 (1962), reversed per curiam, 374 U.S.
493 (1963).
'367 U.S. 643 (1961).
To these causes cedebres must be added the recent
decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. (1966) and
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. (1966).
The opinions in these two important cases were not
of certain orthodox police methods and techniques
not involving acts of violence with respect to the
persons, the property and possessions of suspects
or those charged with alleged criminal offenses.
Besides prohibiting and restricting certain long
existing police practices, the cases require-and, as
a practical matter, in effect demand-that affirma-
tive steps "on behalf of those in custody" be taken
by the police. The end result is a set of ostensible,
or at least theoretical, safeguards and standards of
police administration, judicially designed and
created to prevent infringement and denial of
alleged constitutional rights of criminal suspects
when they are investigated, arrested and processed
by the police.
Some have hailed these decisions as the "mil-
lenium of civil liberties" or as "the ultimate
constitutional interpretation in terms of safe-
guarding the constitutional rights of those accused
of crime". On the other hand, many observers
would employ different descriptive nomenclature;
namely, that these judicially inspired restraints
imposed upon the police are "really for the birds,"
and the wrong "birds" at that. Authorities on
announced until several months after the original re-
search and drafting of this article was completed;
consequently, they are discussed and analyzed in a
special addendum.
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police methods now claim that the courts are un-
duly restrictive; that the results will be additional
hobbling of the police, further obstruction of
effective law enforcement, and even more "cod-
dling" of the criminal element in our society. There
are those who assert that the standards imposed by
the courts in the name of civil liberties and
individual rights are too visionary and too far-
fetched for a world of concrete realities.
Judge Desmond aptly indicates that Escobedo,
Mapp, and the others, have generated "loud
emotional outbursts", comment, and evaluation by
two groups of extremists. For the lack of a better
characterization, the two polar groups could be
designated as (a) the ultra-liberal libertarians and
(b) the "hardnosed" police and their ultra-
conservative supporters. The first group might be
described by the more effusive members of the
loyal opposition as "cop haters," or members of the
"Bleeding Hearts Society". In contrast, the police
and their supporters are sometimes referred to, in-
directly, as "Neanderthalian", "sadistic cops", or
"the Gestapo of the modern police state".
Unfortunately, much of the law review comment
about the due process oriented decisions of the
Court seems to have been influenced by, and
reflects the approach of, one or the other of the
aforementioned groups. As Judge Desmond has
intimated, the material published on the subject
abounds with either hosannas of approbation or
contrasting howls of castigation directed at the
Court. Attitudes seem to have been too often
influenced by strong emotional overtones rather
than objective analysis. Obviously, there is room-
and considerable need-for more objective con-
sideration and evaluation. A more rational, ob-
jective dialogue is the basic purpose of this convo-
cation.
Today in this symposium, I would like to be on
the side of the angels. But such a favored position
might be difficult to achieve, particularly in any
discussion in this field of the criminal law, con-
sidering the somewhat earthy, transitory com-
plexion of the fact patterns, the substantive law,
and the problem area involved. I will settle by
taking sides partly and tentatively with the police.
This voluntary, free-will confession of my own
sympathies, possible leanings, and prejudices, is, I
hope, in the interest of an objective evaluation of
my remarks.
Utilizing seemingly dynamic and distinguishing
fact and/or legal factors, the recent criminal law
decisions of the Court-at least for purposes of
discussion and evaluation--can be grouped under
the labels: (1) search, seizure, and the exclusion of
"tainted evidence," (2) confessions and incrimi-
nating statements, and (3) right to counsel. There
is in the decisions a large measure of overlapping
of the aforementioned dynamic factors; conse-
quently, the suggested grouping is tenuous,
arbitrary, and even might be described as kaleide-
scopic. Actually, segregation of multi-faceted cases
into airtight legalistic compartments is not only
difficult, it is virtually impossible. In a sense, the
difficulty in classification and indexing would
appear to be a phenomenon of appellate decisions
in general, because the facts and their inherent
legal dynamics not only vary in appearance and
interpretation; they differ in impact and ultimate
significance on a case-to-case basis.
Furthermore, the opinion-writing process in a
multi-judge appellate court often entails months-
long negotiation and rewriting in order to reach
even general agreement on the pertinent operative
facts, the questions and issues raised, and the
applicable legal theories and principles. To add to
the confusion and the difficulty of precise analysis
and classification, there are startling variations in
the quality of the judicial craftsmanship and
opinion-writing expertise, or lack of such, on the
part of judges assigned the task of authoring
opinions for a particular appellate court, and this
generalization does not exclude the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Some of the opinions to be discussed herein, in
particular Escobedo v. Illinois, exemplify the con-
fusion and difficulty of classification as well as
defects, inadequacies, and ambiguities in articula-
tion and writing. Actually, the majority opinion in
Escobedo has, to date, defied any clear under-
standing and evaluation by commentators, courts,
and other legal authorities. A clear and workable
delineation of its intended guidelines or standards
has simply proved to be an impossible taskY
Admittedly, there is no problem in recognizing and
understanding the Court's ultimate disposition and
the legal effect of the ruling in Escobedo; i.e., what
happened to Danny Escobedo as to whether he won
or lost his appeal. The last three units of communi-
cation appended to the majority opinion are the
words "Reversed and Remanded". Curiously
Even the reigning majority of the United States
Supreme Court would appear to recognize the defects
inherent in Escobedo. See Miranda v. Arizona, which is
discussed in addendum to this article.
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enough, these words were not simply an after-
thought of the majority, but a matter of style and
form-with little or no opportunity for flexibility or
digression in terms of indicating the majority's
ultimate disposition of the case. The words
"Reversed and Remanded" are indeed words of
art and impact. Their meaning is unambiguous,
and, in this sense, their impact directly contrasts
with the remaining verbalizations and turning of
pert phrases in the majority opinion. Danny won
his appeal to the Court, although it should be
noted that the "victory" was by a scant five-to-four
margin.
Some comment seems appropriate as to (a) the
purpose to be served by the writing of opinions in
appellate cases, and (b) the role and function of
appellate courts, including in particular the role
and function of our highest appellate court, the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The problem of other judges, of lawyers, and
law teachers, in evaluating and ascertaining the
judicially intended effect of appellate decisions
seldom, if ever, involves any question as to
what was the ultimate disposition of the basic
claims, or the basic conflict between the respec-
tive litigants.8 For example, it was easy enough
to ascertain whether Danny Escobedo would
go to jail or would be given a new trial. The cru-
cial problem lies in attempting to interpret what
the appellate court said or wrote in the form of legal
justification in support of the particular disposi-
tion. Perhaps for the information of laymen it
should be noted that an appellate court only
decides the particular case before it at any given
time. The action of the court in one case does not
decide other cases not before it for disposition. But
the decision in a particular case may become a
precedent for the disposition of analogous cases
which are subsequently litigated in trial or appel-
late courts. Thus, an appellate court's written
explanation for its disposition of a particular case,
theoretically, and I use the word advisedly, becomes
a guide to be considered, evaluated, and given some
effect as to subsequent cases with respect to (a)
their resolution at the trial level, and/or (b) their
disposition in the event of an appeal.
Obviously, this by-product of appellate decision
making-i.e., the parts of a judicial opinion con-
taining the exposition of reasons for the decision
8 In a criminal law context the litigants consist of a
defendant, or defendants, accused of an offense against
society, and an accusing governmental body charged
with enforcement of the criminal law.
itself-can become most significant. But this
aspect of appellate decisions becomes most con-
fusing and frustrating when an important opinion,
or a series of opinions in a particular area, is poorly
written and lacking in clarity of expression. For
example, the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
confession area, particularly the opinions in Haynes
v. Washington,9 Spano v. New York,"0 and Crooker v.
California,n are confusing; and when all are
considered together they are lacking in exposition
of clear-cut, understandable guides or standards
for determining whether a particular confession or
incriminating statement will be or should be
constitutionally admissible in evidence. The
Escobedo majority opinion reaches a new all-time
high in the low quality of judicial draftsmanship
in terms of its precedental value in analogous fact
patterns. If any support is needed for this author's
criticism of Escobedo, it certainly can be found
in the thumping critical comments of Justices
Harlan, Stewart and White.n
Recognizing the internal operating or functional
problems of any appellate court and the difficulty
of indicating, with consummate precision, the
factual, legal, social and moral reasons for a given
decision, it should be noted that for the last ten
years a seminar for appellate judges at New York
University has been attended annually by fifteen
to twenty state appellate judges.1 3 Much emphasis
and attention have been given to the mechanics
and the art-and it is just that-of opinion
writing.
Escobedo and some of the other opinions of the
Supreme Court in the area of criminal law adminis-
tration indicate or at least suggest that some
members of the Supreme Court just might learn
something; and that lawyers, judges, and law
professors, attempting to cope with, decipher, and
evaluate decisions of the Supreme Court might
profit, if some of the judges of that Court could
5373 U.S. 503 (1963).
10360 U.S. 315 (1958).
"U.S. 433 (1958).
2Justice Harlan termed the Escobedo rule "most
ill-conceived". Justice Stewart writes that the opinion
is "supported by no stronger authority than its own
rhetoric". Justice White suggests that the "new and
nebulous" Escobedo rule abandons "the Court's prior
cases defining with some care and analysis the circum-
stances requiring the presence or aid of counsel and
substitute[s] the amorphous and wholly unworkable
principle that counsel is constitutionally required
whenever he would or could be helpful".
13Finley, "Judicial Administration: What is this
Thing called Legal ReJorm?" 65 CoLum. L. RIv., 569,
573 (1965).
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attend the opinion-writing sessions of the New
York University Seminar. It might further be
suggested that their roles should not be that of
honorary observers, but as participants and stu-
dents in the study of opinion-writing techniques
and standards.
Judge Desmond criticizes and expresses some dis-
agreement with the various decisions of the Court
concerning unlawful searches and seizures and the
"tainted evidence" rationale. His criticism seems
to be directed at the legal validity as well as the
social and other values emphasized, or tacitly
championed, by the Supreme Court in cases such
as Weeks v. United States,4 and Mapp v. Ohio. I
wholeheartedly agree with Judge Desmond's criti-
cism and the telling point he makes with respect to
the failure of Mapp and Weeks to provide protec-
tion for anyone other than the criminal elements
in our society." However, the general tenor of
Judge Desmond's remarks seems to indicate and
accord a high degree of inevitability and irrevocable-
ness to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
unlawful-arrest and search-and-seizure, the right-
to-counsel, and the confession cases. 16
If this analysis of his position is valid, I must
take strong exception. Granted, all must and will
agree that the particular disposition of the case
before the Court (assuming proper jurisidiction) is
final and binding as to the parties and the courts or
judges involved, whether they be federal or state.
The Constitution has stationed the Supreme Court
at the apex of the courts; its determinations in the
interpretation and application of the federal consti-
tution are binding and the controlling law of the
land. But the prestige and power of the Court does
not mean that the reasons given by the Court
majority in a five-to-four decision should be sacro-
sanct and beyond critical analysis and evaluation.
American legal writing has been characterized by
its critical "in-depth" analysis of appellate court
14 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
151 have concurred in the result, or dissented, con-
sistently in the unlawful search and seizure cases pre-
sented to the Washington Supreme Court for disposi-
tion wherein the prevailing rationale has been the
"tainted evidence" theory. See, e.g., State v. Michaels,
60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962), and State v.
Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2d 92, 241 P. 2d 447 (1952).
16 Judge Desmond writes: "That answer [the Weeks
and Mapp rationale] is not going to change and must
be accepted."; "Policemen, with all the help we can
give them, must relearn their jobs so as to live with
the Mapp rule and the emerging confession rules."
Desmond, Reflections of a State Reviewing Court Judge
Upon the Supreme Court's Mandates in Criminal Cases,
57 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 301, 303 (1966).
decisions in terms of their practical and social as
well as legal effects. It would seem that the inter-
relationship between due process decisions of the
Supreme Court and criminal law enforcement is a
particularly appropriate area for sensitive analysis
by other judges, lawyers, and members of the
teaching profession, as well as law enforcement
officials and interested segments of the general
public. Of course, any criticism of the Court which
might emanate from such study should be made in
the light of the unique functional role which the
Court occupies in our scheme of government.
7
This leads to a significant question. Are there any
common legal, constitutional, or factual denomi-
nators in the judicial opinions rendered in the
search-and-seizure, confession, and right-to-counsel
areas?
In the confession cases, beginning with Brown v.
Mississippi,"6  and culminating in Haynes v.
Washington and Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court was
concerned with police excesses ranging from actual
physical abuse and torture to a confession "secured
by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain
circumstances, to allow a suspect to call his wife
until he confessed". 9 Due process considerations
appear to have been the umbrella concept em-
ployed by the Court in justifying its decisional
dispositions in the confession area. While it may
readily be perceived that the privilege against
self-incrimination contained in the fifth amend-
ment played a most significant role in determining
whether a particular confession was constitu-
tionally admissible, due process is the generic and
17 In HAND, THE BILL OF RIOHTS (1958), that dis-
tinguished jurist and legal scholar indicates consider-
able doubt about the historical or constitutional au-
thority for the Court's self-assumed power as the final
arbiter-or, as some would have it, for the doctrine of
"judicial supremacy." However, the author indicates
that the inevitable conflicts inherent in our system of
separation of powers necessitated that a supremacy of
judgment be vested in one of the three branches of
government on "ultimate" questions, and the Court
was unquestionably the best branch in which to vest
such a power.
1 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), (in de-
scribing Haynes v. Washington). It should be noted at
this juncture that the picture presented by a composite
of thirty years of confession cases which have reached
the Supreme Court is indeed an ugly and shocking one
in terms of undeniably demonstrating that there has
been police brutality-at least on the part of some
law enforcement officers in some localities. However,
there is a total absence of supporting documentation
in any of the confession cases for the proposition that
such conduct was generally representative of police
practices nationwide, or that police had exhibited a
"tendency" toward such conduct.
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all-encompassing term applied to the states by the
Court by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.
In the right to counsel area, the Court has
forthrightly stated that the right to counsel por-
tion of the sixth amendment is made applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.20 The Court has effected
this same transmutation, or formulation, in the
search and seizure area. Similarly, in Mapp v.
Ohio, the provisions of the fourth amendment with
respect to the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, with its federal concomitant
-the exclusion of so-called "tainted evidence"--
was made applicable to the states through the
aegis of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The trend seems rather obvious that the Court
majority has incorporated more and more of the
specific, as well as the implicit, provisions of the
Bill of Rights within the focus of the due process
clause. Thus, fourteenth-amendment due process
has become the touchstone for the legal and consti-
tutional justification for the functioning of the
Court in the confession, unlawful search-and-
seizure and right-to-counsel areas.n Our initial
inquiry, consequently, should be: What is due
process?
We know that the words "due process of law" are
contained in the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution. But the fourteenth amend-
ment contains no language expounding or delineat-
ing the intended meaning, implications, and appli-
cation of the due process concept. It would seem
logical to conclude that the words must denote or
constitute a somewhat flexible legal concept.
Perhaps the words "due process" are, as Mr.
justice Holmes said of other words, "a skeletal
framework" or merely the "skin of ideas", further
describable, metaphorically, as an empty vessel to
be filled with the thoughts, ideas, and historical,
social, ethical, moral, and other values of appellate
judges who are called upon to decide the due proc-
ess question presented.
20 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 1 
It should perhaps be noted that many of the note-
worthy cases, e.g., Massiah v. United States and Wong
Sun v. United States, involve federal prosecutions.
Obviously, the provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment are not discussed in those cases, since only federal
law enforcement is involved. Nevertheless, the concept
of due process still plays at least a background role,
inasmuch as virtually all of the specific amendments
have been incorporated within the ambit of the due-
process clause of the fourteenth amendment
These observations provide, once again, the
timeless jurisprudential question as to whether the
judicial function involves nothing more than
searching for, finding and applying the law; i.e.,
existing or known rules, previously known but
perhaps forgotten universals, or even transcen-
dental, legal rules or concepts. An alternative, and a
more expansive view of the judicial function, was
recognized and emphasized by Cardozo in noting
that "law in its higher reaches is creative",
implying that appellate judges, at least, may and
do resort to historical, ethical, moral social and
political values (and inevitably to their own
personally oriented value system, or value judg-
ments) in the decision-making judicial process. It is
to be noted that Arthur I. Corbin expanded upon
the Cardozian view of the judicial function in pro-
claiming that "law is creative in all of its reaches".n
In order to appear somewhat less than totally un-
orthodox-and to exhibit the minimum apparently
requisite judicial demeanor-it would seem to be
advisable to withhold approval of the full thrust of
Corbin's thesis. Suffice it to say that the Corbin
formula merits more than casual meditation.
Actually, although one may be tempted to register
more than mild approval and some extension of
Cardozo's statement that law is creative in its
higher reaches, perhaps discretion is the better part
of valor, and the qualifying element of Cardozo's
formulation should be tentatively accepted. Surely
Cardozo's notion suggests itself as a possibility, and
perhaps a probability, to students of or participants
in the appellate judicial process in the criminal
law administration area.
Some of the comments in this writer's dissent in
Tacoma v. Heatern seem pertinent and may be
worth quoting in an effort to clarify and under-
stand the meaning and implications in a judicial
opinion of the all-persuasive constitutional term,
"due process":
The words, due process, like other con-
ceptualistic language of the United States
Constitution, are not self-defining, self-
implementing, or applicable automatically.
Life must be breathed into them; and content,
substance and meaning must be accorded by
the judiciary. This function was well under-
stood by the founding fathers in formulating
the Constitution as a basic, guiding document
2 Corbin, A Creative Process, 6 YAix L. R.P. 2
(1959).
"67 Wash. 2d 721, 743-745, 409 P.2d 867, 880-8
(1960) (Emphasis added.)
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of government. The function is more and more
recognized, even today, as an intended and
proper one for which the judiciary has re-
sponsibility and authority. In the words of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162, the concept of
constitutional due process was elaborated as
follows:
"The requirement of 'due process' is not a
fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be
respected in periods of calm and in times of
trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens.
But 'due process,' unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis
respect enforced by law for that feeling of just
treatment which has been evolved through
centuries of Anglo-American constitutional
history and civilization, 'due process' cannot
be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of
any formula. Representing a profound attitude
of fairness between man and man, and more
particularly between the individual and
government, 'due process' is compounded of
history, reason, the past course of decisions,
and stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith which we profess. Due process
is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a
yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate proc-
ess of adjustment inescapably involving the
exercise of judgment by those whom the
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of
the process.
"Fully aware of the enormous powers thus
given to the judiciary and especially to its
Supreme Court, those who founded this
Nation put their trust in a judiciary truly
independent-in judges not subject to the
fears or allurements of a limited tenure and by
the very nature of their function detached
from passing and partisan influences."
Cardozo, in the Paradoxes of Legal Science,
implies that judges, in a sense, are like oracu-
lar-like arbiters, whose public role is the
resolution or compromise of antiheticals- op-
posing values and concepts. In this frame of
reference the instant case involves two anti-
theticals. On the one side there is the individual
and his rights equated with concepts of liberty and
freedom. On the other, there is society, group
interests and rights, equated with the concepts of
ordered liberty and freedom through government
under law. The two considerations or abstrac-
tions, in one sense, can be separated as not
related to each other. This, however, even
conceptually for purposes of laboratory dis-
section, is unrealistic. Consideration of an
individual and his rights brings about, in fact,
subtly precipitates, consideration of society
or the rights of the group. This, in turn, leads
to a consideration of the individual, not
separate and apart, but as a member of society
and the group, and vice versa. Few individuals
have been able to resign from the human race
or from society. Nor can they easily do so
today. The planet has become too small. The
two antitheticals hereinbefore posed, tenta-
tively or at least forensically, are extremes. As
posed, they suggest other relationships-a
world in which liberty is absolute in contrast
to a world in which no liberty exists (assuming
these hypotheses are theoretically possible); an
anarchistic society as against a totalitarian
one; a world of no government and no rules in
contrast to a world that is all rules and all
government. Our American-way world, our
government structure and its operation,
attempts to avoid each of the polar extremes,
emphasizing in the process the Golden Rule
and the principle of the greatest good for the
greatest number. This requires, of course, that
a line be drawn by someone, somewhere between
extremes, many times, in many situations, and
over and over. Much of the responsibility and
authority for performance of this line-drawing,
balancing function is invested in the judiciary by
our state and national constitutions.
Assuming that interpretation and application of
"due process" as a constitutional concept permits,
and actually requires, a viable judicial balancing
process wherein judges draw upon their experience,
training, and their personal value structures,
perhaps it would be profitable to examine the
opinions rendered by the Court in the area of
criminal law administration with a view to identify-
ing the ethical, moral, historical, cultural considera-
tions, and the sociological values which the
majority may hold paramount. At one recent
judicial seminar discussion of due process and the
nature of the judicial function, the question was
raised as to whether this kind of theorizing-by
either judges or commentators-was just too neo-
realistic and really quite dangerous. The implica-
tion, of course, was that judicial decision making
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in the due process area, if recognized as oftentimes
creative, would correspondingly imply that judges
are not always bound by legal rules and principles
-whether they be constitutional in nature, or
statutory, or a result of the operation of stare
decisis. Any such "egg-head" theorizing might even
imply that due process cases were being decided
according to "the length of the Chancellor's foot."
In a response, reference was made to a commentary
of the late Judge Charles E. Clark to the effect that
it would be even more dangerous to be unrealistic
and to reject or ignore the facts of life by paying
absolute obeisance to the fiction that judges may
only look for-and must ultimately find-"the
law" 24
Concrete, identifiable legal principles and pre-
vious decisions in a given area are not always the
sole determinants of appellate cases. If one attaches
any credence to the thoughts of Judge Clark,
forthrightness concerning any judicial decision-
whether or not it is in the troublesome due process
area-is more equatable with personal judicial
responsibility, than playing "ring-around-a-rosy"
and resorting to comforting fictions about the in-
exorable "law finding" process. The latter attitude
actually permits an avoidance of responsibility,
particularly on the part of the appellate judges, in
reaching, and justifying, their descisions. Resort to
legal, concepts as though they operate auto-
matically obscures, if not obliterates, the under-
lying value judgments involved, and the resulting
denigration of personal judicial responsibility
should be too obvious for further elaboration.
Judicial conscience and judicial discretion are the
ultimate determinants of the role of the courts in
the "Cardozian" formulation of the nature of the
judicial process in the "higher reaches of the law."
Forthrightness and realistic recognition, of the role
of judicial conscience and discretion provide the
most ideal stabilizer for judicial decision-making.
Regrettably, the majority opinions of the
Supreme Court in recent important cases involving
criminal law administration cannot be character-
ized as "forthright!'. They either abound in
glittering legal generalities or are vague and am-
biguous in terms of providing dearly identifiable
reasons for the decision. It is especially note-
worthy that many of the recent decisions have not
been unanimous. In fact, there are quite a number,
including Escobedo, Wong Sun, and Haynes, in
which the Court has split five to four. Here, there
14 Clark and Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge,
71 YA, L. J. 255, §§ 7 and 8 (1961).
is no quarrel with the proposition that the Supreme
Court of the United States, and other appellate
multi-judge courts, are and should be empowered
to render decisions on the basis of majority rule-
even if only by a majority of one. As a result, a
composite or consensus of the value judgments of
five members of the Court has frequently deter-
mined the outcome in criminal law administration
cases. Therefore, it would seem all the more
important for the prevailing majority to indicate
precisely the determinative facts, the crucial legal
postulates, and the paramount social or other
values which motivate striking a balance in favor
of the constitutional "rights" of Danny Escobedo
or Wong Sun vis-a-vis the rights of society. The
majority opinion in Escobedo dearly "flunks the
course" in this respect-at least in the eyes of
Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote in dissent:
The confession which the Court today holds
inadmissible was a voluntary one. It was given
during the course of a perfectly legitimate
police investigation of an unsolved murder.
The Court says that what happened during
this investigation "affected" the trial. I had
always supposed that the whole purpose of a
police investigation of a murder was to
"affect" the trial of the murderer, and that it
would be only an incompetent, unsuccessful,
or corrupt investigation which would not do
so. The Court further says that the Illinois
police officers did not advise the petitioner of
his "constitutional rights" before he confessed
to the murder. This Court has never held that
the Constitution requires the police to give
any "advice" under circumstances such as
these.
Supported by no stronger authority than its
o=n rhetoric, the Court today converts a routine
police investigation of an unsolved murder into a
distorted analogue of a judicial trial. It imports
into this investigation constitutional concepts
historically applicable only after the onset of
formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so,
I think the Court perverts those precious
constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the
vital interests of society in preserving the legiti-
mate and proper function of honest and pur-
poseful police investigation.
Like my Brother Clark, I cannot escape the
logic of my Brother White's conclusions as to
the extraordinary implications which emanate
from the Court's opinion in this case, and I
share their views as to the untold and highly
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unfortunate impact today's decision may have
upon the fair administration of criminal
justice. I can only hope we have completely mis-
understood what the Court has said.2
5
I cannot resist the comment that if Mr. Justice
Stewart has difficulty interpreting the opinion of
the majority in Escobedo, and is alarmed and
shocked at some of the affectation of legal logic and
reasoning, it should not be surprising that his
convictions and misgivings are shared by most law
enforcement officers-and, I daresay, by a sub-
stantial majority of state trial and appellate judges.
The foregoing discussion sets the stage. There is a
patent necessity for a more rational and objective
approach to achieve a better understanding of the
socio-juristic problems raised by Escobedo and the
other cases. In this connection, it is hoped that the
preceding remarks have provided a more realistic
understanding or awareness about (1) the nature of
the judicial process, (2) the implications of the
words "due process" as a constitutional law
concept and (3) the basic conflicting social and
other values (the rights of the individual in contrast
to the rights of society) inherent in the Court's
decisions in the categories of search and seizure,
confessions, and right to counsel.
Judge Desmond indicates some qualms about (a)
the value judgments which apparently underlie
the "tainted evidence" exclusionary rule originally
enunciated in Weeks v. United States, and amplified
in Silverthorn Lumber Company v. United States,
26
Henry v. United States,n and Silverman v. United
States,28 and (b) the policy thrust of those deci-
sions. Judge Desmond's misgivings encompass the
landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio, which applied
the policy thrust and the "tainted evidence"
doctrine of Weeks to state courts. It is somewhat
gratifying to know that Judge Desmond is not
convinced of the inevitability of the so-called "fruit
of the poison tree" doctrine. But he seems resigned
or inclined to bow to the apparent trend of current
pronouncements in the confession and right to
counsel categories. Perhaps this stems from a
conclusion that the latter two areas are perma-
nently calcified in their present state; or because
Judge Desmond finds himself in substantial agree-
ment with the legal posture and value structure of
Escobedo, Mlassiah, et al. I cannot agree with Judge
28 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 494 (1964)
(dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.) (Emphasis added).
26 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
301 U.S. 95 (1959).
28 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
Desmond on either score, in view of the confused
and amorphous nature of Escobedo and the dubious
validity of the value judgments underlying that
case.
The basic deficiencies which Judge Desmond and
I detect in the federal (and now state) exclusionary
rule can be traced to the source case: Weeks v.
United States. Mr. Justice Day, writing the opinion
for the Court, provides some insight into the values
or assumptions which may have motivated the
members of the Supreme Court in 1913. A convic-
tion for using the mails to conduct a lottery was
reversed because portions of the evidence admitted
at the trial had been seized in a search of the
defendant's home conducted without a warrant
and without the consent of the defendant. The
opinion states:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain convictions by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced con-
fessions, the latter often obtained after sub-
jecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the
Federal Constitution, should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.29
It is particularly noteworthy that the opinion
makes no attempt to document the prevalence of
the "tendency" of law enforcement officials to
flaunt citizens' basic constitutional safeguards.
Furthermore, the opinion attempts no exploration
of the possibilities, if any, of seeking alternative
means of protecting the sanctity of a "man's home
as his castle". Judicial contempt citations for
offensive law enforcement conduct and/or legisla-
tive imposition of penal sanctions for overzealous
investigative activities, or provisions for recoup-
ment of damages from the government for in-
vasions of citizens' homes without warrant or
probable cause, might have been considered as
plausible, and more rational, alternatives. Instead,
Mr. Justice Day wrote as if "such fundamental
rights" as freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure included a positive constitutional mandate
which "taints" illegally seized evidence and
prevents its use in subsequent criminal prosecu-
tions. But no such evidentiary mandate appears in
the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitu-
tion.30
- 232 U.S. 383, 392 (Emphasis added).
30 Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio, 50
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Even assuming that the dreaded spectre of the
"police state" was a reasonable possibility in 1913,
the Court used this emotionally convincing, but
factually dubious, prop to flail and check the
Court-conceived "boogie man"-i.e., hypotheti-
cally widespread and unbridled intrusion of law
enforcement officials into the sanctity of the 1913
American home. In the absence of historical or
other documentation, the accuracy of any such
generalization about the 1913 status of criminal
law administration and enforcement seems highly
questionable. Nevertheless, the basic assumptions
of Weeks, and its underlying policy decision, have
been applied consistently in the federal courts for
fifty years.
Wigmore caustically referred to the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule and its pre-Mapp adoption by some
states as "misguided sentimentality," permeating
the federal courts and even rapidly infecting the
state courts. But, aside from dissent by Wigmore
and a few others, the basic Weeks rule and its Mapp
hybrid have been subjected to surprisingly little
critical editorial comment in the law journals. The
dearth of critical comment might well be a result of
the fact that many of the conviction reversals
resulting in either new trials or the release of
criminal defendants have occurred in illegal search
and seizure cases which, fortuitously, have in-
volved "less than conscience-shocking" crimes.
Lack-luster cases not involving sex or violence may
not be sufficiently newsworthy for widescale atten-
tion in the public press. As a result, the decisions
have generated little public concern or protest
about any resultant adverse effect upon (a) law
enforcement, and (b) the expectations of citizens
regarding an effective administration of criminal
justice.
For example, in Amos v. United States,3' a
conviction for violation of the prohibition laws was
reversed. Illicit whisky had been seized after an
illegal search consented to by defendant's wife,
A. B. A. J. 815 (1964). Justice Taft (of the Supreme
Court of Ohio) points out that the majority opinion in
Mapp's precursor, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
recognized the fact that the fourteenth amendment
does not require a state or federal court to suppress
logically relevant evidence obtained by illegal search.
Justice Taft further notes that the Weeks-Mapp for-
mula is "supposed to discourage state police officers
from making unreasonable searches and thereby to
provide a remedy against them. However that will
only be the indirect or remote effect of this imposed
requirement. Its direct effect will be to protect the crim-
imal and frequently to free a guilty man." (Emphasis
added.)
3"255 U.S. 313 (1921).
who, the Court thought, was "impliedly coerced"
into allowing the liquor agent to search the prem-
ises. In Silverman v. United States, a gambling
conviction was reversed. Police officers had testi-
fied as to an incriminating conversation among the
defendants, overheard by means of an electronic
listening device which the officers had manipulated
through an adjoining party wall into heating ducts
of the alleged gambling establishment. Even Mapp
v. Ohio involved a relatively intocwnes crime. Dolly
Mapp was convicted in the Ohio courts for posses-
sion of "lewd and lascivious books, pictures and
photographs".
Long before Mapp, the Washington State
Supreme Court yielded to "misguided senti-
mentality" and adopted the federal rationale
prohibiting the use of "tainted evidence" in
reversing a prohibition law conviction in State v.
Gibbons. 2 The Washington court has continued to
apply the rule in other, less than dramatic, criminal
cases; e.g., State v. Bwxkley,n involving larceny of
some watches and travelers checks, and State v.
Michaels,n4 involving a gambling law violation.
A slightly exaggerated hypothetical (that vener-
able law school vehicle for analytical discussion)
might help focus our attention on the deficiencies in
the fable, "the fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Charity Hope is a vivacious, charming eighteen-
year-old resident of Serenity Village. Her father,
now deceased, was the Village's outstanding hero
in World War II. Faythe N. Hope, the child's
blind mother, has most admirably learned to live
with her affliction. She is adored by all for her
motherly and housewifely qualities in making the
neat, white cottage a wonderful home for Charity.
Charity is to be the valedictorian of her high school
class. Frequently, she spends her evenings at the
local library, either reading for the blind or for a
group of retarded children.
On one such evening, Charity does not reach
home at the usual time. After several hours, her
mother tries not to worry, but finally succumbs and
telephones the local police. Unfortunately, the
police are unable to find a trace of Charity. Several
people saw her leave the library just after dark.
That is all. Two days pass, and, despite the con-
stant efforts of local, county, and state law enforce-
ment officers, not a single clue as to the fate of
Charity is produced.
On the third day, Officer 0. Howe Zealous, a
'11118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922).
- 145 Wash. 87, 258 Pac. 1030 (1927).
60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
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close family friend of the Hopes, interrupts a
month's vacation at the ocean to help in the search
for Charity. On the way to his post of duty at the
station house, he sees a small foreign automobile
making an illegal turn in downtown Serenity
Village. He is not overly concerned with traffic
violations, considering the local concern about
Charity and her mother, Faythe N. Hope. How-
ever, he decides the traffic offender should be given
a ticket. With red lights flashing and siren blaring,
Zealous signals the foreign automobile off the road.
He notes that the brake lights of the car are not
functioning. Following standard procedure, he
commences a discussion of the traffic violation with
the driver of the automobile. Officer 0. Howe
Zealous quickly detects a strong odor of whisky on
the driver's breath, and becomes somewhat exas-
perated with the driver's insolent manner. He
decides to cite the driver for his malfunctioning
taillights, as well as the illegal left turn. But the
driver, in typical inebriate fashion, insists the tail-
light must have, just at that very moment, shorted
out in some way or another. The driver becomes
outraged when officer Zealous suggests that he dis-
continue driving in his present condition, and
requests the keys. The officer takes the ignition and
trunk keys from the driver's hand in order to ascer-
tain whether the wiring had really shorted or the
brake lights were otherwise defective. Before the
driver can object, Officer 0. Howe Zealous unlocks
and raises the trunk lid. Revulsion and sadness
overcome him as he discovers the cruelly beaten,
bloody, almost unrecognizable, sexually abused and
mutilated, macabre remains of Charity Hope.
The rest of the hypothetical is obvious. Remem-
bering that the author of a hypothetical, by defini-
tion or otherwise, has unlimited literary license as
to the uniqueness of the fact pattern, let us hy-
pothecate that there is absolutely no evidence to
tie the driver (whose name, incidentally, is Sick
Sam) to the rape and murder of Charity Hope,
other than the evidence acquired in the now legally
dubious search of the trunk by Officer 0. Howe
Zealous. The evidence found in the trunk includes
bloody clothing and shoes worn by Sick Sam, and
the death weapon, a heavy tire tool with Sick
Sam's fingerprints on it. Admittedly, if the hypo-
thetical approximated an actual crime, the atmos-
phere in Serenity Village, and perhaps elsewhere,
would not be conducive to objective analysis.
However, the hypothetical permits an inquiry as
to the basic underlying objectives of criminal law
administration: Are these the ascertainment of the
truth in criminal trials, and in the maintenance of
law observance and enforcement, or should these
objectives be counter balanced (or even out-
weighed) by the policy decisions of Weeks and
Mapp in the interest of protecting the individual
rights of American citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures? Obviously, strong emphasis
on the latter social value would lead to the sup-
pression of all of the evidence discovered by Officer
0. Howe Zealous. Does Sick Sam have a funda-
mental or constitutional "right" to have such
evidence excluded? Or does he, and more normal
and healthy Americans, have only the right to
expect that the courts and other branches of
government will seek means to curtail happen-
stance or deliberately "overzealous" law enforce-
ment actions through more rational means than the
questionable doctrine of the Weeks and Mapp
cases?
It has been indicated previously that due process
formulations in criminal law administration deci-
sions entail a basic judicial balancing or accommo-
dation between the fundamental civil liberties of
individual criminal suspects and the rights of
society, apropos of efficient and effective police
investigation and criminal law enforcement. Few, if
any, search and seizure opinions have been docu-
mented by data that reasonably support the infer-
ence that there is "a tendency" to a lesser or
greater degree for law enforcement officers to
continuously and brazenly flaunt the constitutional
safeguards of citizens against unreasonable searches
and seizures. It is submitted that the balance is
ineptly struck by the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence.
If substantial numbers of law abiding citizens
are subjected to unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, what effective relief is provided by the
doctrine of Weeks and Mapp? The doctrine and
its exclusion of perfectly good, probative evidence,
except for the "taint" implied in Weeks, closely
approximates "throwing the baby out with the
bathwater" in specific criminal cases. The Weeks-
Mapp doctrine does not provide specific, corrective
or punitive action for the constable or other police
officers who may have erred or blundered. In
addition, Weeks and Mapp certainly provide for
no recoupment of damages for unreasonable in-
fliction of harm upon either the persons or the
property of either criminal suspects or completely
innocent but imposed-upon American citizens.
How are such innocent citizens protected by the
exclusion of "tainted evidence" in prosecutions
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that in no way affect them? It seems a reasonable
conclusion that those innocent citizens, to be
ostensibly protected by Weeks and Mapp, would
never be prosecuted or convicted, because, despite
blunders of the police, they simply are not guilty-
irrespective of the evidence gained by an unreason-
able search and seizure of their persons or pos-
sessions.
Does not the exclusion of "tainted evidence"
have the effect of authorizing or permitting some
type of ad hoc judicial cemnency (for those who
would otherwise be convicted if the evidence had
been legally obtained), which is extra-legal, ex-
tra-constitutional, and presently beyond even the
clemency power and authority of the executive
branch of government? Is not the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine an emotional offspring
of the glib and appealing, but not necessarily
valid, rich6 that it is far better that one hundred
guilty men go free than that one innocent man
should suffer? Is it rational that letting one hun-
dred guilty men go free will protect one innocent
man? What are the probabilities of turning fewer
criminals loose and still not punishing one innocent
man?
Beginning with Wigmore, it has been suggested
that the so-called "taint" attributed to evidence
by Weeks does not actually reduce or negate its
probative value in relation to the question of
guilt or innocence in a criminal prosecution; fur-
thermore, that such evidence should be admitted,
and that other alternatives should be found to
discourage and control any alleged "tendency" of
the police to utilize or indulge in unreasonable
searches and seizures.3" Wigmore suggested that
under court rule, or legislation, contempt of court
procedures could be utilized to note police mis-
conduct and to devise and provide discipline or
punishment to fit the offenses against the courts
and the proper administration of criminal justice.
This alternative has been suggested by others.36
Commissions to investigate and act in matters
of alleged police excesses and brutalities seem to
be the vogue today in some quarters. The full
implications of this mode of thinking are subject
to considerable qualifications. However, the
"commission" idea, strictly limited to the prob-
lems of (1) search and seizure, (2) confessions, and
(3) right of counsel, might well provide a more
rational and effective alternative, not only to
35 8WiGmoRE, EvmxcE 36-37 (3d. ed. 1940).
38Blumrosen, Contempt of Court And Unlawful
Police Action 11 RuTGEnS L. R1v. 526 (1957).
Weeks and Mapp, but to Escobedo, Massiak, and
Wong Sun. In the search and seizure field, so-
called "tainted evidence" would be admitted.
Criminal trials would proceed in the normal
manner in terms of decision making by juries
regarding innocence or guilt. Claims of injury or
harm to person or porperty, and claims of viola-
tion to fourth amendment and/or due process
constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure would be administratively evaluated
and monetary damages awarded against the state
or other appropriate governmental body. Damages
would be awarded in appropriate amounts to
claimants subjected to police misconduct, whether
they were (a) alleged or convicted offenders, or
(b) innocent citizens who were not prosecuted or
not found guilty.
Any such commission, obviously, would be
composed of the highest type citizen-leadership
in a given community. It might well include
lawyers, law-enforcement officials, perhaps even
judges and sociologists, as well as representative
members of the public.
The use of the contempt power and/or the
commission concept and other solutions that
might be developed offer a more rational and
effective means of coping with the problems of
police impropriety than can be expected to result
from the necessarily hit or miss efforts of the
Supreme Court in random opinions rendered in
the miscellany of cases presented to the Court for
disposition. The Court can provide direction and
leadership; but the job of providing supervision of
the administration of criminal justice in all of the
courts of this country is too complex and too en-
compassing for the awkwardness and the indirect-
ness of the process of appeal, certiorari or habeas
corpus. The limited number of cases which the
Court is able to hear is another inhibiting factor.
These observations should be apparent, consider-
ing the nature of the appellate process and the
over-all workload of the Court in other areas of
the law not concerned with the administration of
criminal justice.
CONFESSIONS
The discussion herein focuses upon the various
criteria of admissibility accorded significance, or
from time to time utilized, by the Supreme Court
of the United States in determining whether in-
criminating statements are admissible in evidelice
in the trial of the criminally accused.
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The original rule, as adopted in Hopt v. Utah,"
emphasized the voluntary or involuntary nature
of the confession in adjudging its admissibility:
Elementary writers of authority concur in
saying that, while from the very nature of
such evidence it must be subjected to careful
scrutiny and received with great caution, a
deliberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among
the most effectual proofs in the law, and con-
stitutes te strongest evidence against the party
maki. tg it tiat can be given of the facts stated in
such confession.
But the presumption upon which weight
is given to such evidence, namely, that one
who is innocent will not imperil his safety or
prejudice his interests by an untrue statement,
ceases when the confession appears to have
been made either in consequence of induce-
ments of a temporal nature, held out by one
in authority, touching the charge preferred,
or because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating
upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in ref-
erence to the charge, deprives him of that free-
doma of will or self-control essential to make his
confession voluntary within the meaning of the
law.
Whether a confession or incriminating state-
ment made by a criminally accused was a product
of his own free will was the sole determinant of
the admissibility of such evidence until 1941.
Then, in Lisenba v. California,ns the Court indi-
cated that, irrespective of its voluntariness, con-
sideration would be given to "the fairness or
unfairness" of utilizing the testimony at the trial:
The aim of the rule that a confession is inad-
missible unless it was voluntarily made is to
exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to
determine whether the inducement to speak
was such that there is a fair risk the confession
is false. These vary in the several States. This
Court has formulated those which are to gov-
ern in trials in the federal courts. The Four-
teenth Amendment leaves California free to
adopt, by statute or decision, and to enforce,
such rule as she elects, whether it conform
to that applied in the federal or other state
-' 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (Emphasis added in
quotation).
-8 314 U.S. 219-236 (1941) (Emphasis added in
quotation).
courts. But the adoption of the rule of her
choice cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether,
in a given case, the application of the rule
works a deprivation of the prisoner's life or
liberty without due process of law. The aim of
tie requirenrent of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fun-
danmental unfairness in tiet use of evidence,
whether true or false.
Despite the change in emphasis implicit in Lisenba,
the decisions in Crooker v. California and Spano v.
New York emphasized and apparently authorized
the voluntary-involuntary test for the admissi-
bility of confessions. The different fact patterns
in cases allowed some pruning and grafting, or
judicial discretion, in the state and lower federal
courts. Crooker seemed to epitomize the Court's
definition of a voluntary confession, delineating
various factors and considerations, the sum total of
which meant that a confession or incriminating
statement merited the voluntary label and would
be so characterized and treated by the Court.
Comparable to Crooker's basic lexicography,
Spano set out a reasonably understandable for-
mula for defining and describing an "involuntary"
confession, which should be excluded from the
evidence in a criminal case, and would surely be
proscribed by the majority of the Supreme Court
if given a "look-see" opportunity through appeal
or otherwise. Then Hay nes v. Washington upset
this tidy little two-wheeled apple cart by focusing
on the police nrethods involved, while paying only
"lip service" to the voluntary-involuntary ration-
ale.
Judge Desmond intimates that lawyers and both
federal and state judges, and, perhaps more im-
portantly, the body politic, must learn to live
with the confession decisions of the Court.39 He
then asks a rhetorical question: "Are we moving
toward a rule of constitutional law which will
prohibit the taking of incriminating statements
from a suspect, or at least prohibit doing so with-
out first instructing the suspect as to his right to
counsel and other protections?" The rhetorical
question suggests uncertainties and a considerable
amount of confusion respecting the ultimate
thrust of the decisions in the confession area.
319 Policemen, with all the help we can give them,
must relearn their jobs so as to live with the Mapp
rule and the emerging confession rules." Desmond,
supra note 16 at p. 303.
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This, it seems to me, is inconsistent with the
statement that we must "learn to live with" the
rules in confession cases. How can we learn to live
with something so undefinable and difficult of
apperception? Or, perhaps, it is like living with
and accepting other mysteries; we flounder, frus-
trated and confused, but finally resign ourselves to
do the best we can in deference to a vague and
undefinable mystery. As to whether confessions
are to be substantially or wholly prohibited, a
better answer than I can muster was recently
offered by a member of the Court who participated
in the appellate decision making or policy process
which has culminated in the troublesome decisions
in Haynes, Escobedo, and Massiah. Dissenting in
Escobedo v. Illinois, Mr. Justice White wrote:
The decision is thus another major step in the
direction of the goal which the Court seem-
ingly has in mind-to bar from evidence all
admissions obtained from an individual sus-
pected of crime, whether involuntarily made or
not.40
In the light of the policy judgment of the Court,
as intimated in the dissent by Mr. Justice White,
that it is best suited to supervise police methods,
it may be helpful to examine a number of the
older confession cases. Against this particular
background, the nature of the concern of the
Court, and others, regarding police excesses be-
comes somewhat easier to understand.
The most dramatic and shocking case situation
is probably Brown v. Mississippi, where a young
Negro boy apparently was whipped and hung
from a tree with a rope around his neck-so beaten
that he could not sit down at the time of his trial.
In Spano v. New York, the defendant was interro-
gated from early evening into the following morn-
ing by relay teams involving sixteen law enforce-
ment officers. Finally a rookie policeman, formerly
a friend of defendant, speaking the defendant's
native language, urged him to confess to protect
the rookie policeman's status on the police force.
In Reck v. Pate,41 the defendant was held incom-
municado without counsel for approximately
eighty hours, during which time he was exhibited
to the public from a window, was deprived of
sleep and nourishment, and vomited blood. In
Towtsend v. Sain,42 a drug addict was held for
40 378 U.S. at 495.
41367 U.S. 433 (1961).
42372 U.S. 293 (1963).
three days without counsel, and was administered
"truth-serum".
Several other cases in the confession series
demonstrate physical and mental coercion, if the
facts as related by the respective defendants are a
reasonable approximation of the truth. These
cases apparently made the headlines, and certainly
have made the law digests and the law reviews.
But what data is available to indicate that they
may be typical? Often there is a trail of evidence
that could easily be followed by a tenderfoot scout
engaged in his first "hounds and hares" exercise.
As a consequence, to what extent are confessions
given voluntarily and somewhat readily by con-
science-stricken criminal defendants, or by those
who realize that the police have them "dead to
rights"?
It should be emphasized that the quarrel at
this point is not with the exclusion of confessions
involuntarily given; nor with the voluntary-in-
voluntary tests of Spano and Crooker. The basic
confusion and concern emanate from the indica-
tion that the Court means to exclude confessions
and incriminating statements altogether, whether
or not they were voluntarily given.
Apropos of these comments, Haynes v. Washing-
ton seems directly in point. Prior to Haynes, the
Court had emphasized various plus or minus
characteristics or personal attributes of the con-
fessor, the sum of which reasonably indicated a
confession could be said to be voluntary or in-
voluntary. In Payne v. Arkansas,3 and Fikes v.
Alabama,44 the subnormal intelligence and psy-
chiatric instability of the defendant confessors
were heavily weighted in the direction of involun-
tariness. In Gallegos v. Colorado, 41 and Chambers v.
Florida,46 the youthful ages of the accused con-
stituted the weighted factor in overruling convic-
tions based upon confessions. In L3numn v. Illi-
nois,'1 the Court emphasized the female defend-
ant's lack of previous experience under criminal
law and her relative susceptibility to threats to
her children.
But in Haynes, the majority departed from the
standard of the prior cases. The majority motiva-
tion and policy thrust avoids or gives only a casual
reading and evaluation to the fact pattern-with
little or no consideration given to the individual
43 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
44 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
45 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
46 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
- 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
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personality characteristics and mental posture of
the particular defendant.48 Haynes was of at least
average intelligence. He had a record of arrests
and convictions in a series of criminal violations
ranging from minor to major. The "totality of
the circumstanes" test of Crooker would have
provided a more rational touchstone for resolution
of the facts and the factors involved and might
have provided for a more realistic disposition of
Haynes.
48 It is particularly lamentable that the Court is now
choosing to ignore the unique behavioral characteristics
of individual defendants at a time when the behavioral
sciences are gaining acceptance, and recognition of
their utility in other disciplines. For example, Ralph
Segalman, a professor of sociology at Texas Western,
recently drafted the chart below from an article pre-
It may not be cricket to mention or refer to the
state's evidence of guilt directly in matters involv-
ing criminal procedure and due process evaluation;
nevertheless, evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution can and should be considered and
evaluated as a significant factor operating upon
the calculations of a criminal suspect at the time
of determining whether it may have been to his
best interest, or not, to make a confession to the
police. Such a factor in Haynes was considerably
sented at the Rocky Mountain Social Sciences Asso-
ciation in order to graphically portray the differences in
values between the "middle class" and the "lower
class." One might take issue with the initial amorphous
grouping of middle and lower class, but the point is
still well made.
TurE CuLsTuAL CHAsm
The concept of... in middle-class terms stands for.., but to the lower class is...
Authority (courts, police, Security-to be taken for granted, Something hated, to be avoided
school principal) wooed
Education The road to better things for one's chil- An obstacle course to be surmounted
dren and oneself until the children can go to work
Joining a Church A step necessaiy for social acceptance An emotional release
Ideal Goal Money, property, to be accepted by "Coolness"; to "make out" without at-
the successful tracting attention of the authorities
Society The pattern one conforms to in the in- "The Man"--an enemy to be resisted
terests of security and being "popular" and suspected
Delinquency An evil originating outside the middle- One of life's inevitable events, to be ig-
class home nored unless the police get into the act
The Future A rosy horizon Nonexistent. So live each moment fully
"The Street" A path for the auto A meeting place, an escape from a
crowded home
Liquor Sociability, cocktail parties A means to welcome oblivion
Violence The last resort of authorities for pro- A tool for living and getting on
tecting the law-abiding
Sex An adventure and a binding force for One of life's few free pleasures
the family-creating problems of birth
control
Money A resource to be cautiously spent and Something to be used now before it dis-
saved for the future appears
Ralph Segalman, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Texas Western College, has synthesized the communi-
cations problem besetting middle-class psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers in their attempt to
reach and help the poor. He adapted this chart from an article presented at the Rocky Mountain Social Sciences
Association, Spring 1965.
At a time when serious attention is being given to nize and utilize such data. The over-all effect can only
differences in value structure by social scientists, the be described as degrading to the law in general, and
Court appea-s to be in the process of rejecting any criminal law administration in particular.
formulation or test for confessions that would recog-
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more weighty than the "mild whip"' ' of refusing
permission to Haynes to call his wife until he
made a statement or confession. It would seem
from the following facts that Haynes might have
reasonably ascertained that it was in his best
interests to confess.
Haynes was apprehended within a short time
after the robbery of a neighborhood business. The
police in a prowler car, informed of the robbery,
found Haynes late at night on a sidewalk in a
residential area. They spoke to him and inquired
whether they could be of any assistance. Haynes
assared them he was on the way home. The police
followed at a discreet distance. Haynes walked at
least a discreet distance, but then turned up a
walkway to a residence. While the police discreetly
observed, Haynes made motions at opening the
door, supposedly to his residence or home. The
police waited most discreetly. Thereupon, Haynes
gave up, stating in effect: "You've got me; I did
it." He made similar statements in the patrol car
on the way to the pokey. Shortly thereafter, he
was positively identified in a line-up by the man
and wife who had been victimized by Haynes'
apparent inability to distinguish between what
was rightly his and what was rightly the property
of the owners of a local business establishment.
Considering these and other evidentiary factors
which could be mentioned-all of which were
known to Haynes-it seems somewhat unrealistic,
if not irrational and inconceivable, to conclude, as
did the majority, that the refusal of the police to
permit him to call his wife was the most significant
contributing factor in the decision Haynes made
to give a written confession to the police and a
second written confesssion to the prosecutor. De-
spite the fact that a period of sixteen hours elapsed
between the time he was taken into custody and
the time that the written confessions were ob-
tained by the police, there was no evidence and
no claim whatsoever that Haynes was mistreated
in any manner. In fact, the evidence indicates the
contrary. He was not "hot boxed", or interrogated
in relays and by a number of police inquisitors.
The dissent, written in Haynes by Mr. Justice
Clark, supports the foregoing enumeration of facts
and factors, and understandably, indicates some
consternation with the conclusion of the majority
in Haynes that the written confessions were "invol-
untary".5 0 Justice Clark notes the emphasis of the
49 See footnote 19, supra.
r0 To be forthright and in the interest of objectivity,
it should be mentioned that the affirmance by the
majority opinion on the necessity for curbing what
it denominates as "official misconduct":
The Court concludes, then, that the police,
by holding petitioner incommunicado and
telling him that he could call his wife after he
made a statement and was booked, wrung
from him a confession he would not otherwise
have made, a confession which was not the
product of a free will. In Crooker v. California,
supra, at 436, however, we found no coercion
or inducement, despite the fact that the peti-
tioner's repeated requests for an attorney
were denied and he "was told that 'after [the]
investigation was concluded he could call an
attorney.'
In light of petitioner's age, intelligence and
experience with the police, in light of the com-
parative absence of any coercive circumstances,
and in light of the fact that petitioner never,
from the time of his arrest, evidenced a will to
deny his guilt, I must conclude that his writ-
ten confession was not involuntary. I find no
support in any of the 33 cases decided on the
question by this Court for a contrary conclu-
sion. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment
before us."
A final curious caveat as to Haynes, and perhaps
a significant one, should be ventured despite the
foregoing already lengthy recitation. The majority
decision of the Washington State Supreme Court
attempted to follow the line charted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, distinguishing
between Crooker v. California ("voluntariness")
and Spano v. New York ("involuntariness"). The
totality of the evidence test of Belts v. Brady52 was
also given more than lip service, because disposi-
tion of Haynes in the state court antedated the
overruling of Belts by Gideon v. Wainwright. How-
ever, it seems more than a coincidence that within
a matter of weeks after the decision of the Su-
preme Court granting a new trial to Haynes,
either he or his defense counsel-or perhaps both
of them-apparently made a deal with the prose-
cuting attorney. In the jargon of the trade, the
defendant "copped a plea" to a lesser offense, and,
thereupon, Mr. Haynes was finally on his way to
pay his debt to society at the state penitentiary at
Walla Walla, Washington.
Washington Supreme Court was by a five-to-four
majority-and after considerable trial and tribulation
in appellate conference regarding the disposition to be
made as to the Haynes appeal.
51373 U.S. 503, 525 (1963).
r2 316 U.S. 455 (1942.
19661
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As a practical matter, it can be assumed that
Haynes and his counsel, utilizing a close approxi-
mation of the Court abandoned Betts v. Brady and
Crooker v. California tests, reached the conclusion
that Haynes' best interest would be served by not
taking a chance on a new trial of the initial charges;
hence the willingness to forego trial on the higher
original charge and to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. In other words, the totality of the evi-
dence-even without the suspect confessions-was
convincing and persuasive, if not overwhelming.
Haynes and his counsel considered "the sum total
of the circumstanes," and actually determined, in
effect, that the matter of the "voluntariness" or
"involuntariness" of the confessions and their use
or non-use was of little ultimate consequence in
terms of the outcome of the criminal case against
him. The concern of the Court about the confes-
sions, and its reliance upon "so mild a whip" as
the refusal of the police to permit Haynes to tele-
phone his wife in determining that the confessions
were not constitutionally admissible, seems to
have been an unrealistic, if not an irrational,
exercise in futility.
liGHT To COUNSEL
The problem of how to implement the sixth
amendment provisions concerning the right to the
assistance of counsel with respect to indigent
defendants in criminal cases concerned the Court
for a period of several years. The evolution of
cases-from Powell v. Alabaman to Belts v. Brady
to Gideon v. Wainwright-provides an excellent
demonstration of the line-drawing and balancing
process which appropriately could and should be
performed by the Court in all criminal law ad-
ministration cases. The Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, coupled with the decisions in Hamilton v.
Alabama 4 and White v. Maryland,5 struck a most
rational and appropriate balance between the
antithetical-societal or group rights and the rights
of the individual involved. In these cases, the
judicial expertise or technique employed is in
marked contrast to the fumbling, vague and con-
fusing formulations employed by the Court ma-
jority in the more recent (1) search and seizure,
(2) confession, and (3) right to counsel cases.
There has been little, if any, dissent to the
Gideon rule extending the right to counsel to all
indigent defendants in non-capital felony cases.
53 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
54 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
55 372 U.S. 763 (1964).
Nor is there significant dissent to the underlying
value judgment and reasoning: namely, that the
financially bankrupt status of a criminal defendant
must not be the determinant as to whether he has
the assistance of counsel at trial, or champions his
own cause in the legal arena, and wins or loses by
his own devices.
There can be no question that the impact of
Gideon has been to upgrade the standards of
criminal law administration, although many
questions remain unanswered. For example, how
should "indigency" be defined? Is the Gideon
principle limited to non-capital felonies?, or, what
are the other "serious" crimes to be included?
When must counsel be appointed? This aspect of
Gideon, when merged with the aforementioned
nebulous aspects of Escobedo, presents an evanes-
cent facsimile of "Pandora's Box." At what point
in time or sequence of fortuitous events does the
judicial mirage-i.e., the critical or so-called
"accusatory stage"-materialize and assume
legally recognizable and operational form and
substance? What ascertainable or measurable fac-
tors or events other than the mere passage of time
will work the exotic alchemy that produces not
"fool's gold" but "the real thing"--an accusatory
stage of investigation?
The troublesome aspect of the non-indigent
right to counsel problems lies in the pretrial area
where, in the absence of counsel, confessions or
incriminating statements have been elicited or
overheard. Before turning to Escobedo, the princi-
pal "offender" in this area, Massiah deserves at
least brief analytical attention.
Massiah involved an alleged federal narcotics
violation. Massiah was indicted, retained counsel,
pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. An
alleged accomplice and "friend," cooperating with
the police, allowed a radio transmitter to be in-
stalled in his automobile. After both men had been
released on bail, the accomplice engaged Massiah
in conversation in the automobile. Federal agents
monitored that conversation, which included
several incriminating statements by Massiah.
Subsequently, one of the agents testified to the
incriminating statements at Massiah's trial and
he was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed,
emphasing Massiah's right to the assistance of
counsel in relation to the making of incriminating
statements (a) after indictment, (b) outside of the
jail in the automobile of the accomplice, with (c)
no warning or knowledge that the car was
"bugged".
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It should be emphasized that Massiah is a
federal prosecution; consequently, the language of
the fifth and sixth Amendments is the direct focal
point-with no necessity for the fourteenth
amendment due process reasoning present in cases
involving state action. Furthermore, there is a
curious admixture of sixth amendment right to
counsel considerations coupled with inferences
relating to the fifth amendment's right against
self-incrimination and even possibly a right of
privacy formulation emanating from the fourth
amendment. Difficulties in identifying the under-
lying ultimate value determinant (in the light of
the conduct of the federal narcotics agents) plus
the fact that Massialt is a federal case, make it
dubious, if not impossible, to reliably assess the
impact of this decision upon criminal law admin-
istration. Perhaps it is just another example of the
Court being overly concerned about its conception
of the social undesirability of existing police prac-
tices, and taking a "round house swing" in at-
tempting to exert inherent supervisory influence
or alleged authority of the Court in this general
area.
Escobedo v. Illinois has been dissected, digested,
criticized, infrequently praised, and generally
speaking, received an astonishing amount of atten-
tion in the law journals, at assorted seminars, and
at untold-thousands of "coffee breaks." In fact,
the opinion has been bounced about enough herein
that it should be sufficient to note only a few brief
additional considerations. The lamentable lack of
precision and clarity in the draftsmanship in the
majority opinion, and the misgivings in this re-
spect of the four dissenters has already been dis-
cussed. But Escobedo v. Illinois is more than just a
poorly written five-to-four decision; it is, in my
judgment, demonstrative of a distressing tendency
on the part of the currently ruling majority of the
Court to allow its decisions in the due process area
to become emotionally colored and guided by its
subjective appraisal and ad hoc conclusions or
pure hunches as to the status of police adminis-
tration in the United States today. The majority
opinion cites no supporting data for its apparent
assumption that there are not even minimal
standards of police conduct.
If these impressions were based on a scientific
statistical compilation of nationwide police tech-
niques and standards, it would be difficult to
question or argue with these conclusions but no
no such study is cited by Mr. Justice Goldberg.
Instead, he makes this generalization:
We have learned the lesson of history, an-
cient and modern, that a system of criminal
law enforcement which comes to depend on
the "confession" will, in the long run, be less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through investigation. 6
Professor David Robinson, in a perceptive
article in this Journal, points out that the au-
thorities cited by the Court for this proposition
generally deal with systems of "law" which are
"inapposite to the American System of criminal
justice".n Regardless of the expertise or socio-
political leanings of the particular observer, few,
if any, people would be willing to make a compari-
son and to seriously urge that a close parallel or
analogy exists between police investigations in
the United States today and the brutal methods
utilized in Russia during the Stalin purges of the
late 1930's.
The vision which apparently haunts Mr. Justice
Goldberg and the rest of the Escobedo majority
finds its source in the "lesson of history, ancient
and modem". The alleged 'qesson" poses some
dubious fears concerning dreaded spectres of
antiquity and some of a relatively more recent
vintage such as: the infamous Star Chamber; the
Spanish Inquisition; Stalin's infamous Great
Purge; the macabre history of Hitler's Gestapo;
and, more modernly, sophisticated "brainwashing"
5 6378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
57 Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales for
the Exclusion of ConJessions, 56 J. C=,s. L., C. & P. S.
412, 412 (1965):
The printed title of the referenced Senate Judiciary
material is "Speech of Nikita Khruschev Before a
Closed Session of the XXth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956." The"analysis" is a brief summary and commentary on the
speech by the Free Trade Union Committee (AFL-
CIO). The confessions during the Stalin purges were
obtained by long periods of physical torture and
threats of death, according to the speech. See id. at
34-43, 53-56. For example, Stalin's personal instruc-
tions in the case of the so-called doctor's plot were
quoted as "beat, beat and, once again, beat." Id. at
53-54. The Miller case involved the relevance of evi-
dence of flight after the commission of a crime to es-
tablish guilt. It was apparently cited because of Judge
Bazelon's footnoted reference to a bibliography of
literary, psychoanalytic, and general sociological ma-
terial. The Lifton and Schein books are studies of
brainwashing in Communist China in which prisoners
were subjected to torture, continuous confinement,
and semicontinuous interrogation, often for periods of
years. The Rogge book is also primarily a discussion
of communist confession producing techniques, al-
though it attempts to illustrate confession situations




as perfected by the Chinese Communists during
the Korean War.
Admittedly, the price of liberty-that is, our
cherished American freedoms-is eternal vigilance.
But in an American context this connotes an ob-
jective and rational vigilance and a reasonable
protection and respect for certain fundamental
rights. It does not connote "name-calling", "witch
hunts", or resort to inapplicable historical analo-
gies. In simple words and sequence, is there today
in the United States an even remote possibility of
of a real, appreciable and widespread, tendency
toward the so-called "police state"? It would seem
reasonable to suggest that it might take the co-
operation of at least a few others in positions of
power in order for law enforcement-the police-
to rule supreme, unchecked and unchallenged.
There is considerable question in my mind as to
whether numbers of local, state or federal law
enforcement officials in positions of responsibility
and authority have clearly and consistently dem-
onstrated "secret-police-like" characteristics. I
certainly see no evidence of such "tendencies" on
the part of an entire police force in any given lo-
cality or area.
However, it must be conceded that the police
were indeed heavy handed in their investigation
and interrogation of Danny Escobedo. Retained
counsel was present at the police station. He
requested for several hours in the evening and
until early the next morning that he be allowed to
consult and visit with his client. Danny Escobedo
was not advised of his constitutional rights by the
police, although he consistently requested an
opportunity to talk with his attorney. He was
required to stand with his hands manacled behind
him, and to submit to interrogation for several
hours. He had been without adequate sleep for
several days, and was mentally and physically
upset.
The majority emphasizes the emotional aspects
of the concededly heavy-handed techniques of the
police. Contrariwise, the dissenters interpreted and
construed the same factors and reached an oppo-
site conclusion. It would also seem significant that
an Illinois jury, trial judge, and the Supreme
Court of Illinois found the confession to be a
voluntary one-and constitutionally admissible in
evidence at the trial level. The narrow pin-point-
ing and delimited evaluation of the facts made by
the majority in Escobedo is in marked contrast to
the broad scope and overview facilitated by the
more rational Crooker "sum of the circumstances"
test. If nothing else, the Escobedo majority opinion
is exemplary of the primary role of value judg-
ments in determining the importance of various
factors-and the constitutional significance, if any,
of each fact individually or the fact pattern as a
whole. This balancing, or weighing, of ethical,
moral, historical and cultural values is, as pre-
viously suggested, the essence of the judicial func-
tion in the interpretation and application of the
"due process" concept.
Unfortunately, the policy course charted by
Escobedo, Haynes, Mapp, and the other cases dis-
cussed, is unmistakable. The composite value
judgment emanating from the recent due process
decisions is that the Supreme Court has the power,
and is best situated, to supervise police methods
and standards at the state and local level. If any
additional support is needed for this conclusion,
it can be found in two cases which actually do not
fit any of the previous three categories.
Briefly stated, the salient facts of Wang Sun v.
United States are as follows: federal narcotics
agents, in reliance on an informer's statement that
he had been sold narcotics by one "Blackie Toy,"
proceeded at 6:00 a.m. to the laundry establish-
ment identified as the place of sale by the informer.
The defendant Toy refused to admit an agent who
pretended to be a customer of the laundry-where-
upon the agent flashed his badge and identified
himself as a narcotics agent. Toy slammed the
door and fled to a bedroom behind the laundry,
where he was, subsequently, apprehended and
searched. The agents found no narcotics, but Toy
said that he knew a "Johnny" who sold heroin.
On this lead from Toy, the agents were able to
confiscate a supply of heroin from Johnny Yee.
Having been apprised of the disloyalty of his
"friend" Toy, Johnny Yee returned the favor by
making incriminating statements implicating Toy
and one Wong Sun. Wong Sun was later arrested
at his home, but no narcotics were found. Yee,
Sun and Toy were, subsequently, released after
their arraignment on their own recognizances.
All three were questioned at length sometime
after their release from custody by a federal nar-
cotics agent. Each made incriminating statements
which were later transcribed into typewritten
statements from the rough notes of the federal
agent. There was general agreement among the
three that the statements were accurate; but, for
one reason or another, none would sign the agent's
typewritten renditions, although Toy made hand-
written corrections to his version.
[Vol. 57
SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE
Without delving too deeply into the Court's
analysis of the rather complex interrelation of the
arrests and searches involved, suffice it to say that
the keynote of the majority opinion lies in its con-
clusion that the original arrest of Toy lacked
probable cause. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, concluded that the imprecise state-
ments rendered by a previously untested informer
would not have been sufficient to justify the
issuance of a warrant; hence, they certainly would
not be adequate to justify an arrest without a
warrant. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice
Clark, writing for a dissenting minority of four,
came to precisely the opposite conclusion about
the reliability of the original informer. Justice
Brennan also noted that Toy's subsequent flight
was insufficient to furnish probable cause for his
arrest because of the "ambiguity" of such evi-
dence, and because of the agent's misrepresenta-
tion of identity at the door of the laundry. Mr.
Justice Clark found no such "ambiguity". These
aspects of Wong Sun pose again the knotty prob-
lem of fact evaluation and interpretation at the
appellate and other levels of the judicial process.
There are two extremely troublesome spots in
the Wong Sun majority opinion. The first is the
implicit assumption that existing standards of
police administration make it necessary for the
Court to restrict the practice of the police of in-
vading without a warrant, with the thought that
the suspect's inevitable flight from the "arms of
the law" will subsequently validate an otherwise
questionable arrest. As in the search and seizure,
confession, and right to counsel areas, no attempt
is made to document the inherent assumption that
this police practice is so widespread that judicial
supervision becomes essential.
Secondly, the method of "upgrading" the stand-
ards of police administration-at least for federal
narcotics law enforcement officials-is particularly
regrettable, since the majority affects a subtle
graft or transmutation of the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" rationale in invalidating the verbal in-
criminating statements made subsequent to the
illegal arrest.
The apparent thrust of the decision is that the
initial lack of probable cause with respect to Toy
"taints" or voids all subsequent police action-
even including evidence produced relevant to the
guilt of Wong Sun. The basic inadequacies of this
doctrine have already been explored in the section
on search and seizure, and it need only be said
that Wong Sun's extension and expansion of that
theory in not particularly persuasive, logically or
legally.
The eternal optimist might suggest that, since
Wong Sun is a federal case, perhaps it will be con-
fined to instances of illegal federal arrest. Such
optimism is unfoundedi See State v. Traub,2 where
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held
that the technical legality of illegality of an arrest
does not automatically render subsequent con-
fessions inadmissible. The Supreme Court vacated
the Connecticut judgment and conviction, and
remanded in a per curiam opinion, citing Wong
Sun and Ker v. California.0
Wong Sun and Traub upset and denigrate our
entire system for the administering of criminal
justice. Given even a technical, and unintentional,
violation of the applicable laws of arrest, the ac-
cused can claim that all that has subsequently
transpired is irrevocably "tainted". Comparisons
or analogies as to the "sporting theory of justice"
become all too appropriate regarding state, as well
as federal, cases involving criminal law adminis-
tration. A violation by the police of the "rules of
the game" on the initial "kick-off" precipitates a
prolonged postponement, if not a forfeit, of the
"contest". Undue emphasis upon the rules seems
a bit out of focus when one considers that the
ultimate objective of criminal justice is supposedly
a search for the truth.
On the civil side of the law we have long ac-
cepted the proposition that "a search for the
truth" is the objective of the law rather than
emphasis upon the technical "rules of the game".
Can we afford to be more fictional and less candid
on the criminal side of the law?
The infiltration of the "tainted evidence"
analogy into cases involving allegedly illegal state
arrests via the dubious Wong Sun-Traub "rick-
sha" has none of the classically deceptive qualities
of the fabled Trojan Horse. It is a patent and
deliberate effort by the Court majority to assume
the responsibility for supervision of police admin-
istration in the states. This field maneuver in an
apparently larger campaign is once again under-
taken without adequate data and planning-cer-
tainly without unanimity on the part of the "Gen-
eral Staff". The results of the changes to be
wrought in criminal law enforcement cannot be
accurately predicted. The adverse effects upon
law and order and the administration of criminal
8 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962).
19 Per curiam at 374 U.S. 493 (1963). Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
ROBERT C. FINLEY
justice could well be such that the efforts of a
bare majority of the Supreme Court, though well
meaning, may have to be characterized by future
commentators as the most ill-founded, unrealistic,
and costly judicial social experimentation in our
time.
CONCLUSION
It may be assumed, quite reasonably, that no
interested commentator or observer, whether he
is a judge, a lawyer, a police officer, or a layman,
would argue with the proposition that the stand-
ards of criminal law administration should con-
stantly be subjected to objective analysis and
appraisal. Concomitantly, remedial and reform
action should be undertaken in the public interest
in appropriate circumstances. But this author's
views of the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the police certainly do not coincide
with those of Judge Desmond, since I believe that
the apparent trend of that relationship (toward
more and more direct supervision of police meth-
ods and standards by the Court) is not necessarily
inevitable. Rather than "learning to live with" the
apparent policy and value thrust of the due proc-
ess decisions discussed herein, the following, by
way of summary of what has been stated herein-
before, would seem to be a plausible, alternative
course of action reasonably designed to contin-
ually upgrade the standards of criminal law ad-
ministration:
1. Written judicial opinions seeking to delineate
standards of criminal law administration should
be models of clear and precise thinking and ex-
position. Metaphor, hyperbole, generalizations,
cliches, and the flashing phrase may adorn and
lift poetic stanzas, and occasionally even judicial
opinions, from the level of the commonplace and
monotonous, but standards of criminal law ad-
ministration must be cast in sterner linguistic
stuff to be understood and acted upon with assur-
ance by judges, lawyers, law professors, and by
the police. Certainly as to laymen-with little, if
any, legal training and perhaps less in the way of
poetical proclivities-carefully drafted, more ex-
plicit opinions should provide a better understand-
ing of the course of criminal law administration as
charted by the courts. Substantial efforts should
be made toward improving the technique and art
of judicial opinion writing through increased
utilization of programs such as the seminar con-
ducted for appellate judges at New York Univer-
sity Law School.
2. Information and data seem to be inadequate
or unavailable at the present time for reliable
determinations to be made by the courts as to (a)
the extent of alleged police abuses and excesses;
(b) as to the social utility and desirability, or the
non-necessity and undesirability, of those allegedly
widespread police practices criticized and inter-
dicted by the Supreme Court in the confession,
search and seizure, and right to counsel cases.
3. A special committee of the American Bar
Association is now engaged in an ambitious pro-
gram hopefully designed to develop more reliable
data and to recommend guidelines or standards
for law enforcement work and the prosecution
and trial of alleged criminal offenders. This could
and perhaps should evolve into a permanent pro-
gram-either government or American Bar Associ-
ation sponsored, or both-designed to provide
reliable current data about existing standards of
police administration and progressive guidelines
for law enforcement work.
4. Patently, the courts should not attempt to
develop their own standards of police administra-
tion without the aid of statistical data such as
that which should eventuate from the current
American Bar Association study.
In the meanwhile, the most obvious catalyst
for an upgrading of the standards of police ad-
ministration could be provided by appropriate
branches of local, state and federal governments
as follows:
(a) Better pay, better retirement benefits, and
better working conditions must be provided in
in order to recruit candidates, outstanding in-
intelligence and other qualifications, for careers
as law enforcement officers. Nothing is more
essential to guarantee that police standards and
performance can keep pace with the needs of
our modern society. It is my understanding that
low pay scales already have been a major factor
in the reduction of physical and other qualifica-
tions for new policemen in a number of com-
munities.
(b) Better law enforcement training programs
must be devised (a) for new law enforcement
officers and (b) for inservice training of existing
personnel. The best thinking, experience and
expertise in law enforcement work must be
made available and should be utilized in the
organization, administration, and operations of
police departments.
(c) Police departments, police precincts, and
police beats must be adequately manned with
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well trained personnel. The police must be pro-
vided the best equipment and facilities obtain-
able.
6. Disciplinary and punitive action for sub-
standard conduct by law enforcement officers-
administered by a police review commission whose
powers and duties would be strictly limited to
certain designated areas-would seem to be a
preferable course of action to the one now being
charted by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The administration of criminal justice is
denigrated by attempts to "police the police" by
forfeiting or postponing "contests" in a game-like
format of "cops and robbers". The "sporting
theory of justice" must be abrogated in theory
and in fact. Claims of damages incurred to person
or property as a proximate result of unlawful
searches and seizures should be adjudicated by
independent, administrative commissions. Com-
pensation should be awarded for unreasonable
injury and harm inflicted, and should be assessed
against either the offending law enforcement
officer or the responsible government entity. A
more realistic and appropriate treatment would be
afforded claims of either innocent citizens or subse-
quently convicted criminal offenders in relation to
alleged constitutional violations and resulting
damages than is now available through judicial
application of the Weeks and Mapp doctrines.
Three decades ago, many lawyers strongly
resisted proposals respecting more effective meth-
ods for review and disposition of charges of mis-
conduct of members of the legal profession. But
integrated bar associations with effective dis-
ciplinary procedures relative to misconduct of
lawyers have now been established in most of the
states. Today, proposals for better methods for
review and disposition of claims of judicial mis-
conduct seem to be meeting with strong disap-
proval in judicial quarters. The trend seems to be
inevitably toward effective means for safeguarding
the public interests respecting the performance of
judicial duties. The California constitution was
recently amended by an impressive majority of
the voters to provide for a commission for review
and discipline of judicial misconduct.
In view of the lack of enthusiasm of lawyers
and judges for more effective disciplinary pro-
cedures, it is understandable that similar proposals
respecting the police meet with significant dis-
approval and resistance from the people who
would be involved; i.e., the police. But again, the
social values and the public interest in proper
safeguards are insistent. With better pay and
other benefits, with better training, with increas-
ing duties and responsibilities, the increasing need
for more and better law enforcement activity, the
trend seems inevitably toward better and more
effective administrative controls regarding law
enforcement practices and functions. This could
well be, not only in the public interest, but in the
best interests of the police. Appropriate develop-
ments in this area could dispense with any neces-
sity for judicial efforts to supervise police methods
through the less effective and somewhat fumbling
judicial techniques demonstrated in Weeks, Mapp,
Escobedo, Wong Sun, et al.
7. With the advent and implementation of the
"commission-type" program, the exclusionary-
"tainted evidence" rule of Weeks and Mapps'
extension of its dubious logic to the state courts
should be abandoned. So-called "tainted evi-
dence" should be admitted in the trial of accused
criminal offenders for whatever probative value a
jury of the defendant's peers may attribute to it.
The probative value of such evidence is certainly
not depreciated simply because of alleged or
actual violation of constitutional rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
8. The respective judicial tests or formulations
of Betts v. Brady and of Crooker v. California in-
volved considerations as to (a) "the totality of
the evidence," or (b) "the sum total of circum-
stances" in the judicial evaluation and disposition
of claims of denial of certain due process rights.
The Betts v. Brady test was rejected by the Court
majority in Gideon v. Wainwright. The Crooker
test was sidestepped or consciously avoided by the
Court majority in Escobedo v. Illinois. The special
fact pattern in Gideon-the denial of counsel in a
felony case-justified nonapplication of the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test by the Court ma-
jority. However, a return to the Betts v. Brady
and Crooker v. California tests in other areas than
covered by Gideon would provide a better vehicle
for consideration and disposition of claims of due
process violations than the amorphous reasoning
and the ambiguous guidelines and standards
resorted to, and apparently recommended, by the
Court majority in Escobedo.
9. McNabb v. United States, 0 and Mallory v.
United States,61 are not discussed in the main
portions of this dissertation. However, it should
be noted that they require that federal criminal
60318 U.S. 322 (1943).
61354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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suspects be taken before a magistrate or other
judicial officer promptly after apprehension and
detention by federal officers. Adoption and ad-
herence to this kind of procedure by the states
would make certain that criminal suspects are
promptly apprised of and properly accorded their
constitutional rights-in relatively calm and un-
hurried, dignified, impartial, and fair court sur-
roundings. It would seem that such a procedure
has great potential for assuring reasonable ob-
servance and protection of the constitutional
rights of those in police custody without imposing
unreasonable and unworkable obstacles to effective
law enforcement.
10. Lastly, confronted by the uncertainties and
confusion in some of the Court's majority de-
cisions, the state courts, as well as the lower federal
courts, have a real problem, loaded with much
judicial responsibility. In these cases the Court
majority now appears to be operating largely
under the due process umbrella-and with much
less than a plethora of supporting scientific or
other data. The state courts and the lower federal
courts in this area of the law must also operate
under the due process umbrella. From the dis-
cussion regarding (a) the factor of creativity in
due process decisions and (b) the lack of clarity in
existing Supreme Court decisions, it seems obvious
that continuation of creativity and the sound
exercise of discretion is not only permissible, but
is required of the state and lower federal courts.
In my criticism of the Court majority, I have
attempted to be forthright and objective. If I
have succeeded in this regard, perhaps this will
accommodate any severity in my criticism of the
Court's decisions. One thing I must make clear:
It has certainly not been my intention to indicate
that the current Court majority has acted ultra
vires of constitutional provisions and mandates,
or contrary to traditional American standards
regarding the judging function and the nature of
the judicial process. Much of my criticism is based
upon, or involves, matters of personal opinion or
value judgment on my part. In summary, my
principal concern is with the following: (1) the
less than precise judicial draftsmanship, exempli-
fied in the nebulous majority decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois; (2) vacillation by the Court and the
short-term validity of decisional touchstones and
determinants; (3) resort to and reliance upon
certain dramatic, emotionally-loaded generaliza-
tions about police administration in the United
States without the benefit of underlying, support-
ing, empirical data; and (4) unwarranted emphasis
upon certain values or considerations resulting
in the striking of an inept balance between the
rights of society and the rights of the individual
by the Court majority.
In terms of law and order in our American com-
munities, the dangers are too great and the stakes
are too high for me to accept without qualms and
to simply try to "learn to live with" the full thrust
of the decisions of the Court majority in the search
and seizure, confession, and right to counsel area.
Even the bounds of stare decisis are not such that
prior rules and decisions become impregnable to
the forces of reason, logic and practicality.
Ping Lui, a sometime Chinese jurist, poet, and
thinker, who lived, as some say, in the Fourth,
or perhaps it was in the Sixth or Seventh Ming
Dynasty, once concluded a dissertation on the
law and the judicial process with the rather per-
tinent philosophical musings that:
Protocol, seniority, and the trappings of
authority are distracting. They may even
confer a tentative acceptability or respecta-
bility upon judicial resolution of problems of
human relationships. But to be worth the can-
dle, the judging function must be a search for
truth. In such a perspective the attributes of
authority, even the personal element in the
authorship of judicial decisions, have little
universal value. Time, experience, and work-
ability will provide the ultimate test as to the
truth and value of judicial decisions.
Should not the troublesome decisions discussed
herein be judged by the same standards?
In conclusion, I return to the title attributed to
my rambling thoughts: Who is on trial-The
Police? the Courts? or the Criminally Accused?
Perhaps all are on trial. Perhaps society is on trial.
Who shall be believed? The Police, the Courts, or
the Criminal Defendants? What are the relevant
social or other data? What reliable points of
reference emerge for the formulation of guides and
standards respecting the administration of crimi-
nal justice?
I hope my remarks have been somewhat inform-
ative and helpful towards some approximation of
a more objective and reliable focus relative to the
kaleidoscopic problems, the complex and often
paradoxical social values involved in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
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Miranda v. Arizona,62 handed down on June 13,
1966, is a startling culmination of the previously
noted recent efforts by the Supreme Court to
assume authority for the delineation of police
standards and practices-both on the federal and
state level. The decision has been described as "a
tidal opinion," washing away much of the debris
deposited on the shore by previous decisions. Like
other tides, it is a combination of forces, of winds
and currents that have increasingly troubled the
waters of criminal justice."" Indeed, the debris
deposited by Escobedo has been, for the greater
part, swept away, but the potential erosive effects
upon an efficient administration of criminal justice
resemble the aftermath of a hurricane rather than
a mere tide.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the now
familiar majority of five, states the issue thusly:
The cases before us raise questions which
go to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence: the restraint society
must observe consistent with the Federal Con-
stitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.
More specifically, we deal with the admissi-
bility of statements obtained from an individ-
ual who is subjected to custodial police inter-
rogation and the necessity for procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to in-
criminate himself."
Instead of attempting to ascertain the particu-
lar facts surrounding the oral and written incrim-
inating statements elicited from the four separate
defendants in Miranda, the majority of the Court
dearly indicated that their primary concern was
with the police methods involved-and not with
the voluntariness or involuntariness of the con-
fessions, considered in conjunction with the sub-
jective qualities of the defendants themselves and
the special facts incident to their respective con-
- 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Actually four cases are dis-
posed of in the opinion: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera
New York, Westover v. United States, and California v.
Stewart. In view of the relatively analogous fact pat-
terns involved, and the majority's treatment of the
four cases as one entity, the opinion is hereinafter re-
ferred to simply as Miranda v. Arizona.
3 Junker, The Supreme Court and Police Interroga-
tion-Beyond Escobedo, 1 LAw AL-mxus 5 (Spring,
1966).
6384 U.S. at 439.
fessions. Crooker v. California"5 and Cicenia v.
Lagay6  are expressly overruled inasmuch as the
Court now has seen fit to specifically indicate the
procedure to be followed by the police before an
incriminating statement will be admissible in the
trial of the criminally accused. It would seem that
any case which considered the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the giving of a con-
fession was sub silentio retired as valid legal au-
thority.G
The new policy thrust and rule is capsulized by
Justice Warren in the following language:
Our holding will be spelled out with some
specificity in the pages which follow but
briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial inter-
rogation of the defendant unless it demon-
strates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised to
itform accused persons of their right of silence
and to assure a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that le has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive effectua-
tion of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone
and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not inter-
rogate him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from an-
swering any further inquiries until he has con-
65 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
66357 U.S. 504 (1958).
67 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 573
(1963).
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suited with an attorney and thereafter con-
sents to be questioned.68
Initially, it should be stated that any criticism
of the Court for failing to be forthright in terms
of clearly indicating the intended effect of a given
decision is patently inappropriate with respect to
Miran&a v. Arizona. There is no attempt to subtly
ingraft upon state and federal standards of police
administration certain general and directional
values; instead Miranda, in unequivocal language,
precisely delineates the procedure to be followed
before an incriminating statement will be deemed
constitutionally admissible in a subsequent trial.
In this respect, it is of more than passing interest
that Chief Justice Warren tacitly, if not expressly,
acknowledges the glaring deficiencies in the Esco-
bedo opinion.
Secondly, it is somewhat heartening to note
that the Court is at least willing to consider the
meager statistical records and data concerning
police standards and practices which are presently
available in conjunction with its decision to di-
rectly assume authority for upgrading those
standards and practices by judicial pronunciation
and articulation. Unfortunately the only current
report referred to by the majority was that of the
1961 Commission on Civil Rights. Other studies
referred to by the court majority, such as the
report of the National Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement (otherwise known as the
Wickersham Report) are of dubious validity since
they deal with police practices in the 1930's. Even
Chief Justice Warren admits the inadequacy of
the data before the court: "[T]he examples given
above [of police excesses and brutality] are un-
doubtedly the exception now, but they are suffi-
ciently widespread to be the object of concern.
69
Similarly, the "manuals" referred to by the ma-
jority in their dissertation on existing police inter-
rogation techniques are not specific guidelines set
out and followed by particular police depart-
ments-but are textbooks, which admittedly have
a widespread circulation, but there is no data
indicating that they are specifically, or even gen-
erally, followed by any number of law enforce-
ment agencies. Nevertheless, in the light of the
previous willingness of the current court majority
to generalize as to standards of police administra-
tion on the basis of little or no empirical data, the
68 384 U.S. at 444-45 (Emphasis added).
69 384 U.S. at 447.
willingness of the Court in Miranda to consider
even the sparse statistics available is gratifyingly
constructive.
In a sense, every due process decision strikes a
balance between order and liberty, between the
rights of the individual and the rights of society.
It is somewhat difficult to capsulize the apparent
value structure and judgment which moved the
bare Court majority of five to weight the scales so
heavily in favor of the individual who is in the
custody of the police as a suspect-as one about
whom their investigation has revealed probable
cause to effect his arrest. The basic underlying
value judgment seems implicit in a quotation from
justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois-which Chief Justice Warren cites with ap-
proval:
The quality of a nation's civilization can
largely be measured by the methods it uses in
the enforcement of its criminal lawY0
It seems to me that the proposition, as quoted, is
deficient and inadequate. It is but another flashy
phrase, another cliche, which obscures more than
it reveals. In my judgment Mirana v. Arizona
involves an unrealistic emphasis upon what the
majority deems to be a "higher quality civiliza-
tion". A more proper frame of reference (in terms
of indicating the balance to be struck) might be:
"The quality of a nation's civilization can largely
be measured by the extent to which it is able to
maintain law and order while utilizing methods of
law enforcement which are not unreasonably con-
sistent with fundamental principles inherent in the
concept of due process of law". At least the com-
peting values, those of society and those of the
individual, are cast in a balance-like context by
the latter phraseology rather than unduly empha-
sizing the allegedly superior interests of the indi-
vidual.
The problem of "the one and the many" is
older than Plato in its philosophical, juristic, tribal
and even familial connotations. But the Court
majority opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, and the
quotation from justice Schaefer, fail to give more
than lip service or bare recognition to the interests
of "the many"-those of society. That giant
among libertarians, John Stuart Mill, and the
utilitarian philosophy of his era, glorified and
attempted to vouchsafe the supreme importance
of the liberty of the individual. But even Mill
70 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARv. L. R~v. 1, 26 (1956).
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recognized that the liberty of the individual,
either in the abstract or in reality, is subject to
some finite limits:
... the sole end for which mankind are war-
ranted, individually or collectively, in inter-
fering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection....
Whenever, in short, there is a definite dam-
age, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public, the case is taken
out of the province of liberty and placed in
that of morality or law 7
The geometric progression of population figures,
popularly termed the "population explosion," and
the related problems precipitated by mass urban-
ization, are household bywords. Adlai Stevenson
said it best when he suggested that the world has
become a "stuffy tenement". As a result, societal
values necessitating increased restrictions upon
individual liberty are the hallmark of the Twenti-
eth Century. Thus the right to counsel becomes
paramount in terms of providing recognition, and
,1 On Liberty, in BunRT, TnE ENGLISH PHmosopHERs
PROm BACON TO MILL 956, 1013 (1939).
adequate protection, of the rights of the individual
in an ever-burgeoning and more complex "Big
Government." But the recognition of the increased
need for the assistance of counsel can not, and
should not, be carried to the extent that the inter-
ests of society are overlooked and substantially
thwarted. In other words, at the risk of repetition,
it is still a matter of balancing involving the rela-
tionship of "the one" and "the many".
Chief Justice Warren blithely states that "The
limits we have placed on the interrogation process
should not constitute an undue interference with a
proper system of law enforcement." 2 History,
which unlike the current Court majority, must
consider not only "the one" but "the many," may
record the error of Chief Justice Warren's predic-
tion. Absent more than a scintilla of reliable data,
to support the evaluation of the Chief Justice and
the Court majority, the social risk is indeed great.
In my judgment it is too great. It should not have
been taken at this time, certainly not without
reasonably reliable social data to support it.
7 384 U.S. at 481.
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